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ABSTRACT. Growing institutional cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, initially explicitly directed at resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict, 
has taken the form of three parallel institutional structures. First, an Anglo-Irish (later, Brit-
ish-Irish) Intergovernmental Conference has dealt with matters relating to the government 
of Northern Ireland in areas to which power is not devolved, and with certain other ‘sover-
eign’ matters. Second, a British-Irish Council links not just the two sovereign governments 
but also the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the crown 
dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man. Third, a matching British-Irish 
Parliamentary Assembly provides common ground for representatives of the legislative 
bodies of the same jurisdictions. The paper tracks the evolution of these structures, and 
assesses the significance of the new institutions for the British-Irish relationship. 
Keywords: British-Irish relations, Northern Ireland, inter-parliamentary relations, ethnic 
conflict. 
Introduction 
The widely-hailed improvement in British-Irish relations in the early twenty-first century was 
at its most visible in the public domain, symbolised in such events as the state visit of Queen 
Elizabeth II in 2011. But behind this lay a pattern of growing institutional links, ones that ap-
peared calculated to reverse the steady severance of Irish links with Great Britain that was a 
feature of constitutional development for more than two decades after the creation of the 
state in 1922. This paper aims to explore these new links and to set them in political context. 
The new institutions were initially part of an effort to find a settlement in Northern Ireland, but 
it is striking that, in varying degrees, they have acquired a life of their own, as they seek to 
develop new relationships between jurisdictions. The following sections examine in turn three 
of these – the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, the British-Irish Parliamentary As-
sembly and the British-Irish Council – and a last section evaluates their impact. 
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The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
In reviewing the institutional aspects of the British-Irish relationship, it is worth recalling a 
long-standing differentiation between arenas of policy responsibility in multi-tier governments. 
Up to 1922, UK rule in Ireland operated at two levels. Some government departments, such 
as the Foreign Office, the Post Office and the War Office, were defined as ‘imperial’ ones, 
and, where they had staff in Ireland, this was managed by relevant London-based cabinet 
ministers. Other departments, such as the Board of National Education, the Department of 
Local Government and the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, were defined 
as ‘Irish’, and were managed directly or indirectly by another minister, the Chief Secretary for 
Ireland. The difference went further than administrative distinctiveness (Coakley, 2010). Are-
as which were the responsibility of ‘Irish’ departments (which were very extensive, affecting 
all aspects of everyday life) were governed by separate ‘Irish’ legislation – laws enacted by 
the UK Parliament, but designed exclusively for application in Ireland. The others were gov-
erned by UK-wide legislation. This distinction corresponds to the classic division in federal 
constitutions between areas that are the responsibility of the federation, such as foreign poli-
cy and defence, and those that are the responsibility of the sub-federal units, such as educa-
tion and policing (Wheare, 1966: 34-38). 
This distinction was observed in the various Irish Home Rule bills and in subsequent devolu-
tion measures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Thus, the Government of Ireland 
(Home Rule) Acts of 1914 and 1920 and the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, which implement-
ed the terms of the Good Friday agreement, distinguished between ‘excepted’ powers, where 
responsibility would remain in London (essentially, the domains of the old ‘imperial’ depart-
ments, corresponding to federal jurisdiction in federations), and ‘transferred’ powers, where 
responsibility was handed over to devolved institutions (essentially, the domains of the old 
‘Irish’ departments, corresponding to the jurisdictions of the component units of federations). 
A third category was also recognised: ‘reserved’ powers, not transferred to the devolved in-
stitutions but available for potential transfer in the future, such as control of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary in the Government of Ireland Act, 1914, and of responsibility for policing in the 
Northern Ireland Act, 1998 (Hadfield, 1988: 52-54).1 
Much of the history of the Irish Free State comprised an effort to gain control not only over 
the kinds of ‘transferred’ powers that were features of all Home Rule measures, and of the 
‘reserved’ powers; the Irish government also chipped away at ‘excepted’ areas until control 
over practically all had been secured by Dublin. Two residual ‘excepted’ matters survived 
even after the 1937 constitution came into force: the Office of Arms (established in 1552 and 
responsible for state ceremonial and heraldic and genealogical matters) and the Commis-
Coakley: British-Irish institutions 
-3- 
sioners of Irish Lights (dating from 1786 and responsible for maintaining lighthouses around 
the coast of Ireland). Following the death of the last head of the Office of Arms, the Ulster 
King of Arms, its responsibilities were partly repatriated to London and partly vested in a new 
office, that of Chief Herald of Ireland, in 1943 (Hood, 2002: 160-164). The Commissioners of 
Irish Lights survived threatened restructuring in 1922 and 1998, continuing as a stand-alone, 
32-county agency entirely independent of the post-1998 North-South structures. 
The new wave of more formalised British-Irish cooperation was driven by efforts to resolve 
the Northern Ireland conflict, and progressed through four phases, marked by the FitzGerald-
Thatcher summit of 1981, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, the Good Friday Agreement of 
1998 and the St Andrews Agreement of 2006. The FitzGerald-Thatcher summit of 6 Novem-
ber 1981 was the third in a series that had been initiated 18 months earlier, designed to pro-
mote an intergovernmental approach to resolving the Northern Ireland conflict (Moore, 2013: 
595-597, 601-607, 617-619). It endorsed a set of ‘joint studies’ prepared by British and Irish 
civil servants, who proposed a three-pronged approach. First, there would be a council that 
would meet at head of government, ministerial and official level to discuss all matters of 
common concern, ‘to contribute to the achievement of peace, reconciliation and stability and 
to the improvement of relations between the peoples of the two countries’. Second, it was 
suggested that consideration be given ‘at an appropriate moment’ to the establishment of a 
parliamentary tier linking the two parliaments. Third, the creation of an ‘Anglo-Irish encounter’ 
organisation was proposed; this would organise joint conferences and might in time evolve 
into an advisory committee on economic, social and cultural cooperation, similar to the Bene-
lux Economic and Social Advisory Council or the European Community’s Economic and So-
cial Committee (Ireland, 1981: 13, 15, 17). 
The parliamentary tier is discussed in the next section. The civil society tier made limited 
progress. Anglo-Irish Encounter was established in 1983, and continued to organise meet-
ings alternating between Ireland and the UK for some years. It was modelled on the Kö-
nigswinter Conference that has taken place annually since 1950; this brings together politi-
cians, diplomats, business managers, academics and journalists from Britain and Germany 
for ‘a profound exchange of ideas’ (Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft, 2013). But Encounter 
was operating on a terrain already occupied by an older voluntary body established in 1972, 
the British-Irish Association, which established a Königswinter-style programme of annual 
meetings that survives to the present (British Irish Association, 2013). Although Encounter 
organised an important series of conferences over the years, the civil society tier envisaged 
in 1981 never emerged. 
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The intergovernmental tier was the major outcome of the FitzGerald-Thatcher summit. An 
Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council was established, but it got off to a shaky start. The two 
governments had disagreed on the handling of the hunger strikes of 1981 and on the priority 
to be given to the pursuit of an internal settlement within Northern Ireland, and the decision of 
the new Haughey government not to support the British during the Falklands/Malvinas war in 
1982 generated long-standing resentment in London (Arthur, 2000: 177-178). It was on the 
occasion of the second meeting of the Council at prime ministerial level in November 1984 
that Thatcher famously dismissed the recommendations of the New Ireland Forum. Never-
theless, the relationships built up both within and outside the framework of the Council ena-
bled politicians and officials from the two sides to come together to seal a more ambitious 
intergovernmental deal, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. 
The 1985 agreement ushered in a new institution under the framework of the Intergovern-
mental Council: an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference with a much tighter focus. This 
was centrally (but not exclusively) concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations be-
tween the two parts of the island of Ireland, especially in respect of political, security and le-
gal matters, where a detailed reform and equality agenda was spelt out. Rather than being 
merely given a voice, the Irish government would have the right to put forward views and 
proposals on the internal affairs of Northern Ireland and, in the event of disagreement be-
tween the two sides, ‘determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve 
any differences’, though ultimate British responsibility for Northern Ireland would remain un-
affected. The Conference would meet ‘on a regular basis’ at ministerial or official level (in the 
former case, headed normally by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Minister for Foreign Affairs), and, importantly, it would have a standing secretariat comprising 
civil servants from the two jurisdictions. This was duly set up in a heavily defended building in 
Maryfield, in the Belfast suburbs. 
The immediate consequences of the agreement were mixed. Paul Dixon (2008: 208-209) 
suggests that the British government had been ‘out-negotiated’ by the Irish. But, while the 
Irish side could eventually point to the achievement of more equal treatment of Catholics with 
respect to policing of marches, flags and emblems, employment and public appointments, 
problems in the areas of the administration of justice, police reform and security policy re-
mained unresolved (Todd, 2011: 58-59).2 The British side in general saw the agreement as 
failing to deliver on its promise (Dixon, 2008: 208-209; Bew, 2011: 48). As Eamonn O’Kane 
(2007: 92-96; 2011: 34-36) points out, though, it is extremely difficult to evaluate an agree-
ment when the objectives of the parties to it cannot be readily identified. 
Coakley: British-Irish institutions 
-5- 
The long-term indirect effects of this initiative appear to have been more important than its 
direct achievements. While senior negotiators (notably Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald) argued 
that it was a mechanism for demonstrating the potency of constitutional politics and thus 
marginalising Sinn Féin, it has been plausibly argued that it was signed ‘as part of a jointly 
designed British and Irish Machiavellian master-plan to coerce unionists into accepting a 
power-sharing devolved government together with an Irish dimension’ (O’Leary and McGar-
ry, 1996: 238). It seems indeed to have eventually encouraged Sinn Féin and the IRA down 
a more political path (McLoughlin, 2014). It certainly offered a powerful incentive to unionists, 
who had been holding out against power sharing, to enter the negotiation process. They 
were outraged by the agreement, which their leaders saw as compromising Northern Ire-
land’s position in the United Kingdom, but it at least provided a mechanism for undermining 
the agreement itself: the Conference would have a role to play only in areas that were not the 
responsibility of a devolved government. Securing the return of a Northern Ireland admin-
istration (even though this would inevitably be based on the principle of power sharing) thus 
offered the only chance for unionists to overturn the provisions of the Anglo-Irish agreement. 
The Good Friday agreement did not sweep away the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Confer-
ence; it created a new British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which would ‘subsume’ 
the existing Anglo-Irish Conference and Council. Its non-threatening image was reinforced by 
the fact that instead of operating in fortress-like conditions outside Belfast like the old Anglo-
Irish secretariat, the British-Irish secretariat was based in an office building in central Belfast. 
The composition of the Conference was broader than that of the old Anglo-Irish Conference: 
crucially, while the two governments are defined as the major actors (with decision making 
by agreement, but with a commitment by both governments to ‘make determined efforts to 
resolve disagreements’), meetings are to be attended also by ‘relevant executive members of 
the Northern Ireland Administration’. By thus involving northern unionists and nationalists, the 
nature of this forum was changed fundamentally from its predecessor under the Anglo-Irish 
agreement, at least in theory. 
A formal basis for the new institution was laid by a British-Irish treaty on 8 March 1999 (De-
partment of Foreign Affairs, 1999b), almost a year after the Good Friday agreement, and it 
finally came into existence at the same time as the other institutions on 2 December 1999. 
The Conference’s first meeting in London on 17 December 1999 was attended by Prime Min-
ister Blair, Taoiseach Ahern, senior British and Irish ministers and, significantly, the First and 
Deputy First Ministers of the Northern Ireland Executive (the only such meeting that they at-
tended). Although it was planned that a further meeting at summit level would take place 
within months, only one other such meeting took place, and that was more than five years 
later, in June 2005. The initial summit also envisaged a ministerial-level meeting in January 
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2000, but in fact no further meeting took place while the devolved institutions were up and 
running in Belfast. Following what would turn out to be a prolonged suspension of the institu-
tions on 14 October 2002, however, the first meeting of the Conference at ministerial level 
took place, on 22 October 2002 in Hillsborough. Between then and the restoration of devolu-
tion on 8 May 2007, a further 17 meetings took place at this level, necessarily in the absence 
of Northern Ireland ministers and thus avoiding potential political difficulties.3  
The functional domain of the Conference is in principle very wide. Recognising the Irish Gov-
ernment’s ‘special interest’ in Northern Ireland, the agreement gave it a voice on all non-
devolved Northern Ireland matters, as well as ‘all-island and cross-border co-operation on 
non-devolved issues’, including security and policing. The mandate of the Conference was 
thus seen as extending over two areas that corresponded respectively with the ‘excepted’ 
and ‘reserved’ arenas discussed above (the remaining ‘transferred’ arenas were the respon-
sibility of the power-sharing administration). As defined at the first summit, these were as fol-
lows: 
• Matters of shared British-Irish interest: asylum and immigration (including the British-Irish 
common travel area), EU and international matters, social security (including methods of 
fraud detection), education, misuse of drugs, organised crime and money-laundering, and 
fiscal issues. 
• Non-devolved Northern Ireland matters: all-island or cross-border matters, the question of 
human rights, policing (including implementation of the Patten Report), criminal justice, 
security (including cross-border security co-operation), the victims of violence, prisons, 
drugs and drug trafficking, and broadcasting (British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, 
1999). 
The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference has been described as ‘a political retreat by 
the Irish government from the transformation in intergovernmental relations attained under 
the 1985 agreement’, a retreat designed to enhance northern nationalist influence in the 
government of Northern Ireland (Fanning, 2005: 141-142). Indeed, the limited capacity of the 
Irish government to influence its British counterpart was exposed in February 2000, when the 
British suspended the devolved institutions against the strong wishes of the Irish side – by no 
means the only disagreement between the two governments at the time. 
The St Andrews Agreement of 2006 had the effect of further reducing the role of the Inter-
governmental Conference. By providing for the creation of an inclusive Northern Ireland ex-
ecutive to manage major devolved areas (which duly took office in 2007), and for the devolu-
tion of control over policing and justice (which eventually took place in 2010), it removed re-
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sponsibility over these areas from the Intergovernmental Conference. While the Conference 
still has a function in respect of ‘excepted’ matters and in relation to residual ‘reserved’ mat-
ters, it no longer holds ‘regular and frequent’ meetings, as provided for in the Good Friday 
Agreement (indeed, it has not met since early 2007). Furthermore, with a widely-shared per-
ception that the Northern Ireland conflict has been ‘resolved’, and new governments that had 
no involvement in the negotiation or implementation of the Good Friday agreement taking 
office in London (2010) and Dublin (2011), the momentum behind the conference seems to 
have evaporated. As well as a drop in staff numbers in its secretariat, the notion of a joint en-
tity was compromised by the withdrawal of the British side of the joint secretariat in 2012 (its 
members returned to their old home in Stormont), leaving the Belfast office staffed only by 
the Irish side. Nevertheless, the secretariat continues to work on unresolved matters arising 
from the Good Friday Agreement, including organising quadrilateral meetings between the 
First Minister, Deputy First Minister, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Irish Minister 
for Foreign Affairs; and its pre-2007 role might again be asserted were the devolved institu-
tions to collapse. 
In a significant parallel development in 2012, Taoiseach Enda Kenny and Prime Minister Da-
vid Cameron announced a reorientation of the British-Irish relationship, with the initiation of 
‘an intensive programme of work aimed at reinforcing the British Irish relationship over the 
next decade’ (Department of the Taoiseach, 2012). An initial outcome was the publication of 
a detailed study of the economic relationship between the two countries (PA Consulting, 
2013). This fed into the work programme of a new Permanent Secretaries and Secretaries 
General Group, bringing together senior civil servants from the two jurisdictions to plan an 
intensification of British-Irish cooperation (Department of the Taoiseach, 2013; McEwen, 
2013). This fresh front in the British-Irish relationship cuts across the role of the British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference, and may well altogether sideline it. 
The British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly 
The last section looked at a set of institutions – the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, 
the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Con-
ference – whose origins may ultimately be traced back to the 1981 and 1985 agreements. 
But, as discussed above, the 1981 summit proposed also that the establishment of a parlia-
mentary tier be explored. This matter was not pursued in the tense political atmosphere of 
the early 1980s, during which the British placed their faith on incremental devolution through 
a new Northern Ireland Assembly by means of ‘rolling devolution’, while the main Irish politi-
cal parties sought to develop an alternative blueprint for political progress through the New 
Ireland Forum. Some discussion did take place from 1983 onwards, however, between Irish 
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and British delegates to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the Anglo-Irish agreement of 
1985 sought to give impetus to the process: the two governments agreed to support any joint 
body that might be established by the two parliaments. Finally, following the recommenda-
tions of a planning group under the auspices of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, headed by 
Peter Temple-Morris, a prominent Conservative MP, and Jim Tunney, Leas-Cheann 
Comhairle of the Dáil, it eventually came into being in February 1990 (see McKay, 1994; 
Taylor and Walker, 1997: 345-347). 
As initially established, the new body consisted of 50 members, 25 from each parliament. It 
sought to maintain a balance between the political parties (with a dominant position occupied 
by the governing parties) and the regions (for example, three places were reserved on the 
British delegation for the Northern Ireland political parties, but only the SDLP took up its seat 
originally). A major change in the structure of the body arose from one of the provisions of 
the Good Friday Agreement, which proposed the creation of interparliamentary links between 
the member-jurisdictions of the British-Irish Council discussed below (there were eight such 
jurisdictions rather than the two represented in the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body). The 
Body’s steering committee and a special working group invested considerable effort in seek-
ing to marry this proposal with the existing structure; the main challenge was how to recon-
cile parity between the two sovereign states with adequate representation for the other 
members (British-Irish Parliamentary Body, 1998, 1999, 2000). Finally, it was decided not to 
replace the Body, but to add a further five members from each of the devolved parliamentary 
bodies (the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly) and one each from the representative bodies of the three crown dependencies 
(the Tynwald of the Isle of Man, the States of Guernsey and the States of Jersey). This con-
trasts with the approach of a similar inter-parliamentary body, the Nordic Council, where four 
large countries initially had equal representation, but the later allocation of seats to three au-
tonomous entities was at the expense of the countries of which they form part. Thus, while 
Sweden and Norway continue to have 20 members each, Finland has dropped to 18 (with 
two going to the Åland Islands) and Denmark to 16 (with two each to Greenland and the Fa-
roes); Iceland accounts for the remaining seven members. 
Continuity in personnel has made an important contribution to the expertise and standing of 
the body. Members are selected as long-term appointees, for the duration of their parliamen-
tary session (alternates may replace full delegates who are unable to attend meetings). The 
main disruption is caused by general elections, which typically have a big impact on the 
composition of particular delegations. But the leadership of the body has been relatively sta-
ble. This was particularly noticeable on the UK side: in its first 15 years, only two people (Pe-
ter Temple-Morris and David Winnick) led the British delegation. Although the level of turno-
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ver on the Irish side was greater, there were still striking elements of continuity in respect of 
personnel. Northern Ireland represented one difficulty. Unionist members of the Northern Ire-
land Assembly refused to attend initially, and while devolution in Northern Ireland was sus-
pended (2002-07) the five Northern Ireland seats remained vacant. A watershed was 
reached in 2006 when a Democratic Unionist Party delegation attended the body’s plenary in 
Killarney as visitors, but it was only in 2008 that a full Northern Ireland delegation took up its 
seats. At the same time, the body was upgraded to an ‘Assembly’, suggesting that it had 
achieved a more secure existence. 
The consensus-seeking nature of the Assembly is underscored by the fact that members are 
seated in alphabetical order rather than by national or party designations (Armstrong and 
French, 2002: 3). In any case, there is a high level of party fragmentation; in 2013 its 67 
members included 15 Conservative, 12 Fine Gael, 11 UK Labour, five Irish Labour, four Lib-
eral Democrat, three Fianna Fáil, three Sinn Féin and two Ulster Unionist members, together 
with one each of four other parties (the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, the Democratic 
Unionist Party and the Social Democratic and Labour Party), and eight assorted independ-
ents (a cross-bench peer, an Irish senator, two Dáil deputies, an independent unionist from 
Northern Ireland, and the three crown dependency representatives). This contrasts with the 
Nordic Council, where ideological divisions cut across member parliaments, and are of some 
significance for political debate (Qvortrup, 2001: 32). In November 2013, its 87 members in-
cluded 25 Social Democratic, 23 Centre Group and 21 Conservative delegates, together with 
eight Left Socialist-Green, six Nordic Freedom and four unaffiliated representatives.4 
The Assembly has followed a regular pattern of biannual plenary meetings, alternating be-
tween Ireland (each spring, normally) and the UK (autumn). Of the 47 meetings that had tak-
en place by the end of 2013, 24 took place in Ireland (typically rather far from Dublin, at ven-
ues such as Killarney, Clonakilty and Bundoran); 16 took place in England (typically in a re-
gional venue rather than London); three in Scotland; two in Wales; and historic ‘firsts’ were 
recorded when the body first met in Belfast (2006) and in the Isle of Man (2010). At each 
meeting, a senior minister outlines government priorities relevant to the work of the body and 
answers questions that can sometimes be quite pointed politically. When the meeting is be-
ing hosted in the UK, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland usually attends; in Ireland, 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs usually represents the Government, but is occasionally re-
placed by the Taoiseach or by another minister. While the Assembly has no legislative role 
and a strictly limited advisory one, it thus constitutes an important forum in which parliamen-
tarians from one jurisdiction can formally question ministers from the other jurisdiction. As 
well as formal dialogue during plenary sessions, meetings of the Assembly (whose agenda 
typically extends over a day and a half) offer an important opportunity for informal network-
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ing. This useful function is compatible with the underlying intention that the body would ‘pro-
mote mutual understanding and respect between members of the two parliaments’, so that 
‘the social side of the body has been almost as important as the parliamentary side’ (Cran-
mer and Roycroft, 2000). 
The business of the Assembly was originally managed by a six-person steering committee, 
comprising three from each parliament (this was enlarged after 2000 to take account of the 
new member jurisdictions). Two sectoral committees were up and running by the end of 
1990, and two others were planned (Shanahan, 1990). Since the latter came into existence 
in 1991, the committee structure has remained unchanged, apart from a renaming of each 
committee in 2000 to take account of enlarged membership and to reflect their actual priori-
ties more accurately. They cover the following areas:5 
• Committee A (Sovereign Matters): this was particularly significant in the early years, 
since monitoring the Anglo-Irish agreement was part of its remit. It has had a special in-
terest in policing and security matters and, because of the sensitivities of the area, has 
produced few written reports. Unlike the other committees, its composition after 2000 
was confined to representatives of the two sovereign parliaments. 
• Committee B (European Affairs): this has focused on the various EU programmes that 
played a cross-border role, including the peace and regional aid programmes. Topics of 
interest have included the common agricultural policy, cross-border trade, transport links 
to and from the island of Ireland, EU funding for social deprivation, and matters relating to 
migrant workers. 
• Committee C (Economic): the agenda of this committee has been very wide-ranging, in-
cluding a focus on economic regeneration especially in Northern Ireland and the Irish 
border counties, and on North-South economic links. It has also considered such issues 
as tourism, pensions and benefits, the work of the International Fund for Ireland, and the 
challenges facing the small business sector. 
• Committee D (Environment and Social): this has focused on the environmental dimen-
sion, with the nuclear energy plant at Sellafield attracting particular attention on the part 
of Irish members. More recently, it has addressed such issues as waste management, 
the integration of migrant workers, and the Irish in Britain. 
The work of the committees consists not just of internal discussions but also meetings with 
officials, community representative and others. Between them, the committees have pre-
pared an impressive number of reports for presentation to the governments and for other 
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purposes. The Assembly web site lists 31 reports produced since 1999 (almost half of them 
by committee D), and 20 formal responses to these by governments.6 At a minimum, they 
have helped to inform the policy process and, in particular, to sensitise members from differ-
ent jurisdictions to the cross-jurisdictional complexities of many of the matters on the agenda. 
Early assessments of the British-Irish Parliamentary Body judged it to be a useful but unex-
citing initiative. Buckland and Cox (1995) saw it as no better and no worse than a typical par-
liamentary committee, a finding that was echoed by Qvortrup and Hazell (1998: 14-16). One 
more positive assessment concluded that, although it lacked a clearly defined remit, and its 
plenary resolutions and committee reports were ‘modest and tame’, it wisely adopted a low-
key approach; the very fact that expectations about its output and impact were so low meant 
that its contribution was not seen as disappointing, and it played ‘a very important symbolic 
role in providing a public display of co-operation between two national parliaments’ (Taylor 
and Walker, 1997: 358-359). The body’s very survival is testimony to the fact that it has 
found a useful niche for itself. 
The British-Irish Council 
Like the Conference and the Parliamentary Assembly, the new British-Irish Council was con-
ceived initially in response to the Northern Ireland conflict, and has been a central part of 
‘strand three’ of the Good Friday Agreement. But it also played a more narrowly political role: 
it was designed to make the ‘Irish dimension’ in the agreement more palatable to unionists by 
providing also a ‘British dimension’ that would be less palatable to nationalists (Walker, 1999; 
Fanning, 2005: 135). This focus on Northern Ireland explains why securing the assent of 
Northern Ireland’s parties to the new arrangements took precedence over getting the ap-
proval of the other jurisdictions; indeed, the governments of Jersey and Guernsey were una-
ware that their inclusion in this body was planned until the matter had been incorporated in 
the Good Friday Agreement (Qvortrup and Hazell, 1998: 19). 
The idea of a council of this kind had from time to time been suggested as a mechanism for 
discussing matters of shared interest in the islands (Graves, 2007). In 1995, for instance, two 
observers had suggested adapting the Nordic model by creating a ‘Council of Islands of Brit-
ain and Ireland’ linking a ‘demilitarised’ Northern Ireland with the Republic, Scotland, Wales 
and England (Kearney and Wilson, 1997). This idea was long associated with Ulster Unionist 
leader David Trimble, but it was not too objectionable to nationalists, one of whom privately 
described it as ‘necessary nonsense’, echoing Brian Faulkner’s dismissal of the Council of 
Ireland agreed in 1973 (Godson, 2004: 340). There were other models of cross-national co-
operation, such as the Baltic Conference, the North Sea Commission and the European 
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Danube Commission, not to mention the many summarised in the acronyms NAFTA, APEC, 
MERCOSUR and ASEAN (Qvortrup, 2001: 27). But the perceived success and visibility of 
the Nordic Council, and the manner in which it linked sovereign jurisdictions and autonomous 
regions, enhanced its attractiveness to the British-Irish case (Fanning, 2005; Qvortrup and 
Hazell, 1998; Bogdanor, 1999; Winetrobe, 2000; Walker, 2001). In fact, it is the British-Irish 
Parliamentary Assembly, which featured little in this debate, that is modelled on the Nordic 
Council; the British-Irish Council resembles more closely a distinct but related body, the Nor-
dic Council of Ministers. 
This new initiative risked falling foul of a parallel development, the establishment in 1999 of a 
Joint Ministerial Committee to link the British government with the political leadership of the 
three new devolved administrations. This new body was to meet in plenary format (involving 
the heads of the British, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish governments) and in functional or 
sectoral format (to deal with specific policy areas). Its terms of reference were wide (United 
Kingdom, 2001). It was envisaged that functional meetings would cover such areas as 
health, the knowledge economy, poverty and the EU. Following an early flurry of activity, 
though, the number of meetings declined, mainly because of the relatively smooth relations 
then existing between the four administrations (Trench, 2001: 154-156). By mid-2004, there 
was speculation that this initiative would simply wither away, since meetings had become 
infrequent, and the three plenary meetings that had taken place (2000-02) had had ‘a ritualis-
tic air’ (Trench, 2004: 514). But as the four administrations began to diverge politically, the 
need for inter-jurisdictional discussion again became apparent. The outcome was that the 
committee system was revived and overhauled after 2007, now with a simpler structure – a 
general-purpose ‘domestic’ committee and a particularly active ‘European’ one, alongside 
plenary meetings (Gallagher, 2012: 201). Officials familiar with the operation of both struc-
tures perceive Joint Ministerial Committee meetings as more free-flowing and robust than the 
more scripted, consensual work of the British-Irish Council.7 
The British-Irish Council was given a formal basis by a British-Irish agreement on 8 March 
1999 (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999a). It comprises the heads of government of the 
eight jurisdictions (the British prime minister, the Taoiseach, the first ministers of Scotland 
and Wales, the first and deputy first ministers of Northern Ireland, and the chief ministers of 
Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man). Its plenary meetings are attended by other ministers, 
and its work is conducted by specialist groups made up of ministers and officials. The Coun-
cil did not originally have a standing secretariat, but was assisted by civil servants in the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs in Dublin and in the Cabinet Office (and later in other government 
departments) in London. Its development was influenced by events in Northern Ireland. The 
St Andrews Agreement of 2006, as part of a complex set of quid-pro-quo compromises, rec-
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ommended that ‘with a view to giving further impetus to its work, the two Governments would 
facilitate the establishment of a standing secretariat for the British-Irish Council’, subject to 
agreement by its members. A review committee of the Council saw merit in this, and finally, 
in February 2012, this was established in Edinburgh. The secretariat currently has a staff of 
six: UK and Irish joint heads, three policy officials from the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ire-
land governments, and an office manager provided by the Scottish government. 
The formal launch of the Council was delayed by outstanding political difficulties in Northern 
Ireland. Finally, once devolved government was reintroduced in Northern Ireland on 2 De-
cember 1999 the new body came into legal existence, and held its first summit in London on 
17 December 1999. The Council has since met regularly at summit level, even while devolu-
tion was suspended in Northern Ireland.8 Initially, it met annually (1999-2007), but since 2008 
it has met twice yearly, each spring and autumn, with minor variations. By the end of 2013, a 
total of 21 summit meetings had taken place – three each in Ireland, England, Scotland, 
Wales and Jersey, and two each in Northern Ireland, Guernsey and the Isle of Man. Striking-
ly, all of these were high-powered as regards attendance, with the prime minister (or chief 
minister, or first minister, or equivalent) normally heading the respective delegations, and 
other senior ministers also present (the British prime minister is an exception, having attend-
ed only a quarter of all meetings). Alongside these, more than 30 ministerial meetings have 
taken place, as well as many more at official level. 
Summit meetings normally focus on the work of specialist groups. The very first summit de-
vised a work programme under which responsibility for selected policy areas was allocated to 
particular governments. The 14 areas on which the Council has focused (including three on 
which work was concluded in 2008) are listed below. In each case, the government respon-
sible, the period during which work has been proceeding and the number of ministerial meet-
ings, if any, is indicated: 
1. Misuse of substances (Irish government, 1999-; eight ministerial meetings): mecha-
nisms for tackling the misuse of drugs and meeting the challenges posed by drug use 
2. Social Inclusion (Scottish and Welsh governments, 1999-; five ministerial meetings): 
approaches to reducing barriers to access to services and to participation in the com-
munity 
3. Environment (UK government, 1999-; 12 ministerial meetings): sustainable develop-
ment, marine management, pollution and waste management, and problems arising 
from invasive species and other environmental hazards 
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4. Transport (Northern Ireland Executive, 1999-): planning of structures to deal with phys-
ical communications, including road safety, transport networks and ferries; two sub-
groups deal respectively with accessible transport and sustainable transport 
5. Knowledge economy (Jersey, 1999-2008): responses to the threat posed by criminal 
attacks and natural disasters to the sustainability of business (work concluded in 2008 
with a set of guidelines on good practice)  
6. Tourism (Guernsey, 2001-2008): matters with implications for tourism, including quality 
standards, training, emerging markets in Asia and the implications of crisis manage-
ment (work concluded in 2008 as it had ‘arrived at its natural end’) 
7. Health: telemedicine (Isle of Man, 2001-2008): capacity of telecommunications tech-
nology to assist remote diagnosis and treatment of patients (work concluded in 2008 
because developments at EU level were seen as superseding this) 
8. Indigenous, minority and lesser-used languages (Welsh Government, 2002-; two minis-
terial meetings): support for the varied linguistic heritage of the Council's member ad-
ministrations, with attention to Irish, Welsh, Scots Gaelic, Scots, Ulster Scots, Manx, 
Jèrriais, Guernèsiais and Cornish 
9. Demography (Scottish government, 2006-; one ministerial meeting): consequences of 
population movement and migration, changing age structure, the growing elderly popu-
lation and student flows 
10. Early years policy (Welsh government, 2008-): policy on early childhood, dealing with 
physical, cognitive, social and emotional development 
11. Energy (UK and Scottish governments, 2009-; one ministerial meeting): exploitation of 
renewable energy resources to generate electricity (Scottish government); renewable 
energy trading and electricity grids (UK government) 
12. Digital inclusion (Isle of Man, 2009-): problems of uneven access and the link between 
digital and social exclusion; attempts to identify common areas and themes through 
comparison of statistics, policy and strategy 
13. Housing (Northern Ireland Executive, 2009-; two ministerial meetings): supply and allo-
cation of social housing, housing benefit issues and affordable housing 
14. Collaborative spatial planning (Northern Ireland Executive, 2009-): role of spatial plan-
ning and of development strategies across borders. 
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The new institutions were launched in a mood of optimism. It was said of the British-Irish 
Council that it ‘has gripped the imaginations of many people in these islands’ (Walker, 2001: 
139). Some observers were sceptical of its potential contribution in domestic UK matters, 
given the existence of competing intergovernmental structures (Hazell and Morris, 1999: 
139-140). Another acknowledged that while the Council might prove to be ‘just a distraction’ 
or a ‘talking shop’, it might also evolve into a forum for the political expression of ‘the inter-
twined links between the Western isles of Europe’, from which might emerge ‘a different and 
non-exclusivist expression of allegiance’ (McQuaid, 2002: 117-118). Others, as discussed 
below, identified a menu of possibilities, ranging from institutional collapse to the emergence 
of confederal-type structures (Lynch and Hopkins, 2001: 757-758). For many of those in-
volved, though (including in particular senior British politicians), its substantive function was 
unclear, and its early progress had been unnecessarily delayed by the very people who had 
called it into existence, Northern Ireland unionists.9 
Assessing the British-Irish institutions 
In evaluating the contribution of the British-Irish institutions, we may begin by looking at the 
impact of these bodies on public consciousness by gauging the extent to which they feature 
in news reports, if only from an Irish perspective. Figure 1 records the number of times each 
of the three institutions discussed here was mentioned in the Irish Times over the period 
1998-2012. For comparative purposes, a fourth institution created by the Good Friday 
Agreement is added: the North/South Ministerial Council, charged with oversight of North-
South cooperation. The profile of the two councils follows the same distinctive curve: they 
attracted a great deal of attention initially, and this continued in the years immediately after 
the Agreement, though at a declining rate, as various implementation issues were threshed 
out. They reached their nadir in 2003, after devolution in Northern Ireland had been sus-
pended, but enjoyed a new lease of life in 2007, with the restoration of devolved government 
there. The profile of the Conference has been much lower, and declined further after 2007, 
as its zone of jurisdiction was whittled away. The parliamentary body attracted modest atten-
tion from the outset, and continued more or less at this level. Three considerations help to 
account for the relatively low profile of the bodies: restricted jurisdictions, limited budgets and 
structural asymmetries. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The first obvious point has to do with the functions which the various bodies discharge. As 
the discussion above shows, each is associated with a formidable list of areas. The Intergov-
ernmental Conference is by far the most significant; it is in theory a forum in which either 
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government can put forward policy positions, and the other government has committed itself 
to working to achieve agreement should this be absent. The range of areas over which the 
conference has jurisdiction, once extraordinarily broad, has shrunk since 2007, but the cen-
tral dilemma is not so much the restricted policy sector as the asymmetry that results from 
the fact that sovereignty is vested in the government of the state in question, so that in 
Northern Ireland matters the British government makes the ultimate decision. In the case of 
the British-Irish Council and the Parliamentary Assembly, the role of the bodies is explicitly 
consultative only. They may draft reports and make recommendations, and their members 
may acquire a more profound and balanced understanding of the issues; but there is no way 
of ensuring that their contributions have an impact on policy. 
Second, none of the bodies has a significant budget; the small allocation made to each is 
designed to cover only its own running costs, with little available over and above this. Since 
salaries and expenses are borne by member components, it is difficult to arrive at overall 
cost estimates. Thus, the British-Irish Council reported direct expenditure of £61,000 for 
2012, and expenses for the British component of the Parliamentary Assembly amounted to 
approximately £170,000. The true costs, allowing for the time of those involved, would be 
much higher; but there is no general purpose budget. By contrast, the institutions of the Nor-
dic Council have a considerable budget, levied on the member states on the basis of their 
gross national product. In 2010, this came to 940m Danish kroner (about €126m).10 This al-
lows the Nordic Council to maintain a very visible presence, and to support a range of influ-
ential cultural and other institutions. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Third, the most important consideration in explaining why the various British-Irish institutions 
have not flourished and, indeed, why it took so long for them to appear, especially by con-
trast to their Nordic counterparts, has to do with the utterly different structure of the two are-
as. As an early comparison pointed out, cooperation of this kind is easier in the Nordic area 
because of shared cultural features (including religious tradition and political ideology), the 
existence of substantial civil society support for the institutions, and the similarity in size of 
the main member states (Qvortrup and Hazell, 1998: 16-17). In the British-Irish context, 
however, six of the eight entities are dependencies or autonomous areas of one large state, 
a seventh is a former part of that state, and the remaining jurisdiction is a major post-imperial 
power. The dilemma is expressed graphically in figure 2. In an ideal geopolitical context for 
institutional cooperation, all eight bars would be of equal size. But the largest member of the 
British-Irish institutions, the UK, accounts for 93% of the population and at least an equiva-
lent share of other resources; the largest member of the Nordic institutions, Sweden, ac-
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counts for less than 37% of the population, with three others accounting for about 20% each, 
a level of similarity that facilitates cooperation. 
In evaluating the three institutions, it is important to begin with the purpose for which each 
was designed. To the extent that this was resolution of the Northern Ireland problem (the 
consideration that led to the launch of each), the record is mixed. We may assume that the 
shared objectives of the two dominant players, the British and Irish governments, were simi-
lar: to procure peace in Northern Ireland, underpinned by domestic, shared government and 
acceptance for the indefinite future of the status of Northern Ireland as a detached, bi-
communal part of the United Kingdom. By facilitating and stimulating the return of devolved 
government to Northern Ireland based on the principles of the Good Friday agreement, the 
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (like its Anglo-Irish predecessor) played an im-
portant part, its success reflected in its shrinking role as power was devolved to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly and Executive. The British-Irish Parliamentary Body played a not insignifi-
cant role in this, by facilitating close contact between ministers and parliamentarians. The 
British-Irish Council played little role, other than the symbolic one embodied in its very exist-
ence and its status as a negotiating trade-off; most of its early meetings included no Northern 
Ireland representation, and its substantive focus studiously ignored the communal problem 
there. 
The three sets of institutions were also designed to respond to another need: to enhance the 
quality of the British-Irish relationship (or, in the case of the British-Irish Council and the re-
designed parliamentary tier, to build up wider relationships between jurisdictions). Here, the 
most significant entity was the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, charged not just 
with responsibility for ‘reserved’ matters but also for certain ‘excepted’ ones, the business of 
sovereign governments. But the central role of the Conference appears to have melted away, 
to be replaced by a less structured British-Irish axis supplemented by formalised contact be-
tween senior civil servants. By contrast, the British-Irish Council has maintained an interest in 
a considerable number of specific sectors, even if its influence is limited; and the Parliamen-
tary Assembly continues as an important forum of contact between parliamentarians and as 
a deliberative body of some importance. 
There is, however, a major dilemma that inhibits the further evolution of the Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Council. It is true that these bodies are attractive to the smallest jurisdic-
tions, the crown dependencies, which may see them as an affirmation of their distinctive sta-
tus. As one official from a crown dependency put it, ‘it is also important for our international 
identity that we be able to have an equal say in the operation of the British-Irish Council 
alongside the Irish Government, UK Government and devolved administrations’.11 These in-
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stitutions are also attractive in Scotland for several reasons: they offer an opportunity to bring 
Scottish expertise in the management of inter-communal tension to bear on Northern Ireland 
(Ramsay, 1998), they have implications for the future structure of the UK (Meehan, 2001: 98-
99), and they constitute a framework within which an independent Scotland could reach an 
accommodation with its neighbours (Sturgeon, 2013). But, unlike the Nordic area, the British-
Irish zone is marked by a history of dominance by one people, and unresolved issues of 
identity and sovereignty remain (McQuaid, 2002: 117). Because of big disparities in popula-
tion and resources between the eight jurisdictions, there is a profound tension between the 
interests of the British government and those of the other administrations (Fanning, 2005: 
138-139). In brief, if the British government sees these institutions as ones in which it is but 
one voice among eight, they will never exercise much influence; conversely, to the extent 
that they acquire power, the principle of equality will be sacrificed. 
One study of the British-Irish Council identified four possible paths of development (Lynch 
and Hopkins, 2001: 757-758): 
• a pessimistic scenario, in which the Good Friday agreement would collapse, bringing all 
the related institutions with it or placing them in cold storage 
• a minimalist scenario, in which the Council would survive but not flourish 
• a gradualist scenario, with the Council establishing a coherent role and identity 
• a maximalist scenario, in which the Council would play a key role in intergovernmental 
relations in a quasi-federal UK and a confederal relationship between the UK and the Re-
public of Ireland. 
This is a useful framework for assessing all three bodies. The British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference is clearly at the lower end of this scale in respect of its impact. Carrying consid-
erable political weight initially, its role in respect of ‘reserved’ matters has been reduced by 
the transfer of additional responsibilities to the devolved institutions, and it has been by-
passed on ‘excepted’ matters by other channels of communication between the British and 
Irish governments. Looked at in isolation, it would have to be classified as now falling some-
where between the ‘pessimistic’ and ‘minimalist’ categories, though it should be recalled that 
it was never intended to be just another institution with static powers: its area of responsibility 
varies inversely with the areas managed by the devolved institutions in Stormont. It would 
probably be appropriate to place both the Parliamentary Assembly and the Council in the 
‘minimalist‘ category during their early years; but each seems to have gained a new lease of 
life more recently, with the Assembly being upgraded from a mere ‘body’ in 2008, and the 
Council acquiring a standing secretariat in 2012 – symbolising modest progress that might 
suggest the ‘gradualist’ category for each. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has suggested that no single powerful cross-jurisdictional institution has emerged 
as part of an effort to resolve the Northern Ireland problem. The existing bodies facilitate con-
tact and aid mutual understanding; but their primary importance at present appears to be 
symbolic. This is attributable to a particular geo-political reality: the extent to which any net-
work of ties is bound to be dominated by the British government, because of the sheer size 
and political weight of its jurisdiction. Not even the increasing independence of the UK’s out-
lying regions appears to threaten Britain’s status as a ‘dual polity’, where regional autonomy 
co-exists reasonably comfortably with ‘the absolute sovereignty of the centre … over a rela-
tively narrow range of issues that it deems of crucial importance’ (Todd, 2003: 81). This is 
likely to affect the operation not just of bilateral bodies such as the British-Irish Intergovern-
mental Conference and whatever may succeed it, but also of the two eight-member bodies, 
the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly. 
The verbal transition in the 1990s from ‘Anglo-Irish’ to ‘British-Irish’ relations (Gillespie, 2006) 
reflects not just a more politically correct description but also a shift from the appearance of 
English dominance. No further transition to a yet more correct ‘UK-Irish’ relationship (which 
would record more explicitly the constitutional location of Northern Ireland) has taken place. 
Indeed, the focus in the cross-channel institutions has increasingly moved away from North-
ern Ireland, with the emergence of further challenges, potentially much more disruptive of 
inter-jurisdictional relations than domestic inter-communal conflict. The two most obvious are 
Scotland’s relationship with the UK, and the UK’s relationship with the EU. Major changes in 
these relationships, on the scale envisaged by the Scottish National Party and by the UK In-
dependence Party and its allies, would call into question other geopolitical relationships. Just 
as the Nordic Council helped to manage the consequences for the Nordic area of Denmark’s 
accession to the EU in 1973 and that of Sweden and Finland in 1995, so too might the Brit-
ish-Irish institutions have a role to play in any redefinition of constitutional relationships in this 
corner of Europe. Ironically, institutions created in response to a conflict in a small disputed 
territory may end up constituting a bridge to deal with troubled relationships on a larger scale. 
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Figure 1: Press references to British-Irish institutions, 1998-2012 
Note: The respective bodies are the British-Irish Council (BIC), the British-Irish Parliamentary As-
sembly (BIPA), the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC) and, for comparative pur-
poses, the North/South Ministerial Council (NSMC). Numbers refer to numbers of instances of the 
respective phrases using the newspaper’s advanced search engine for these names and their 
main alternatives. 
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Figure 2: Population of member-states of British-Irish Council and of Nordic Council, 2011 
Note: Population is in millions. Sovereign states are in uppercase and shaded black. 
Source: United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 2011; Office for National Statistics, ons.gov.uk. 
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Notes 
 Acknowledgement. The interviews and witness seminars referred to in this article are the prod-
uct of the ‘Breaking Patterns of Conflict’ research project in the Institute for British-Irish Studies, 
University College Dublin. Since these are still under embargo, quotations are unattributed; see 
Coakley and Todd, 2014, for a description of this collection. I am grateful to the Irish Research 
Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences for its support of this project. I am indebted to 
officials in the following institutions for information and advice: the Department of the Taoiseach 
and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin; the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
secretariat and the Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister, Belfast; the House of 
Commons, London; the Scottish Parliament and the British-Irish Council secretariat, Edinburgh; 
the National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Government, Cardiff; the External Relations Di-
vision of the Chief Secretary's Office, Isle of Man; the Chief Minister's Department, Jersey; and 
the Policy Council, States of Guernsey. 
  
1. Excepted and reserved powers are listed in article 2 of the Government of Ireland Act, 1914 (4-
5 George V c. 90); the former included the crown, foreign relations, defence and certain other 
areas; reserved powers extended over the areas of land purchase, policing and certain other 
matters. Excepted powers in the Northern Ireland Act, 1998 (1998 c. 47), listed in schedule 2, 
are similar to these; the list of reserved powers, listed in schedule 3, is much longer. 
2. One senior Irish politician of the 1980s valued the direct access to his British counterpart which 
the Agreement facilitated (interview, 1 November 2007). On the other hand, it is clear that there 
was little enthusiasm in the Northern Ireland Office for the practical implementation of the 
agreement; see witness seminar on Anglo-Irish agreement, 11 December 2006. 
3. A search of communiqués in the Department of Foreign Affairs web site (dfa.ie ) reports 15 
meetings, as well as the two summits; the CAIN web site reports 16 meetings as well as the two 
summits (cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/conference). Allowing for overlap between the two lists, 
this comes to a total of 18 ministerial meetings and two summits. 
4. Computed from www.britishirish.org/members-2/ and www.norden.org/en/nordic-
council/organisation-and-structure/party-groups. The Assembly was one member short of its full 
complement of 68 due to a gap in UK representation. 
5. This discussion is based on the annual reports of the body, from the first report (1996) to the 
sixteenth report (2011); available www.britishirish.org/annual-reports/. Formal minutes and more 
detailed ‘summaries’ of the transactions of each plenary meeting are available from the 14th 
plenary (December 1997) onwards; see www.britishirish.org/plenary-sessions/. 
6. See www.britishirish.org/committees-reports/. 
7. Telephone conversations with officials in two devolved adminstrations, 11 October 2013. 
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8. This account is based on British-Irish Council, 2004, 2013, and the communiqués issued after 
ministerial and summit meetings on the Council’s web site, www.britishirishcouncil.org. 
9. Witness seminar, 9 December 2008. 
10. This includes the budget of the (parliamentary) Nordic Council and of the (intergovernmental) 
Nordic Council of Ministers; see www.norden.org/en/news-and-events/press-room/budgets-and-
finance. 
11. Email from official in a crown dependency, 14 August 2013. 
